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NEW PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATE
LAW
Kent Greenfield
The fundamental assumptions of corporate law have changed little in
decades. Accepted as truth are the notions that corporations are voluntary,
private, contractual entities, that they have broad powers to make money in
whatever ways and in whichever locations they see fit. The primary
obligation of management is to shareholders, and shareholders alone.'
Corporations have broad powers but only a limited role: they exist to make
money. Not much else is expected or required of them.
Those who maintain these principles - a group that includes most of
the legal scholars who teach and write in the area - have derived the
narrow role of corporations in one of two ways. A few traditionalists take
it as an article of faith, developed from a rights-based view of the private
nature of corporations.2 Such view holds that shareholders are owners, and
the corporation is their individual property. Their control is to be
respected. Managers are shareholders' agents, and the correct law to apply
is the law of property and trusts. Corporations are to serve their owners,
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This paper benefited from
comments received in faculty colloquia at the Boston College Law School and the
University of Georgia School of Law. Research assistant Jason Radford offered excellent
assistance and suggestions.
1. See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001).
2. Milton Friedman's articulation of the traditional view is the most popular. See
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 33.
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and the proper stance of government is one of deference, with a light
regulator's hand if the hand asserts itself at all.
As more fully developed elsewhere,3 shareholders are not owners in
any traditional sense of ownership. They are not owners in any other
meaningful way either, if one means that there is something that
distinguishes their contribution to the firm from that of other stakeholders.
Historically, the corporation was a public institution with public purposes;
shareholder primacy is a historically recent phenomenon.4 An argument
that corporate governance operates in the realm of natural rights is a
difficult, unpersuasive, and increasingly undefended contention: few of
even the most vehement proponents of shareholder primacy make it
anymore.
Instead, the best and most thoughtful argument for shareholder primacy
is not a rights-based claim, but an instrumental one. Maintaining the
narrow role of corporations and of corporate governance is the best way to
benefit society as a whole.5 Requiring corporations to serve shareholders
first and foremost results in a better society than if the rule were something
else.
The problem with the instrumental claim is that it is largely
unsupported by empirical data and untested by rigorous counterargument.
6
Absent both, the instrumental claim for shareholder primacy reveals itself
to be as founded on faith as the traditionalists' rights-based arguments. The
instrumentalist justification is often merely a post-hoc explanation for the
status quo rather than a serious examination of what society's "best
interest" would require in corporate governance.
3. See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics To Show the Power and
Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 591-601
(2002) [hereinafter Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics]; Kent Greenfield, The Place
of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1998) [hereinafter Greenfield, The
Place of Workers].
4. See generally MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 65-107 (1992) (describing the development of
corporate theory in the latter half of the 19th century).
5. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 441 (stating view that "all thoughtful
people" agree that business should be organized to "serve the interests of society as a
whole").
6. See Kent Greenfield, September 11th and the End of History for Corporate Law, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1422-26 (2002) (partial response to Hansmann & Kraakman's
arguments).
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This article takes a novel approach to developing a set of principles and
policies for corporate law, starting with a focus on society's well being.
With society's interest as the explicit foundational principle, other
principles for the regulation of corporations emerge that are strikingly
different from the status quo. The principles derived here, five in all, begin
at a high level of generality and become more particular and presumably
more controversial. Nevertheless, all of them are rational, practical, and
rooted in the protection of the public good. If adopted, these new
principles and proposals would provide the basis for significant change in
the way we govern corporations in this country.
Of course, the foundational assumption that society's interest should be
pursued will not satisfy those who see corporate law as governed by the
realm of rights. Indeed, this article will not convince anyone who starts
with the assumption that businesses can be run by their shareholder-owners
as they see fit. For most people honestly wrestling with issues of corporate
governance, however, shareholder primacy is not the foundational
assumption but rather one of the potential conclusions. What this article
makes clear is that other potential conclusions exist as well.
Let us start at the beginning.
PRINCIPLE ONE:
THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF CORPORATIONS SHOULD BE
To SERVE THE INTERESTS OF SOCIETY AS A WHOLE
Imagine a situation in which a corporation is thriving. Its shareholders,
workers, and various investors enjoy healthy returns on their contributions
and are all content with the stability and quantity of their earnings. Also
imagine that this corporation, while producing wealth for its investors and
workers, spins off costs that, on balance, ultimately hurt society. These
costs might arise for any number of reasons: perhaps the product itself is
dangerous, the mechanism of production creates pollution, or the company
perpetuates racial prejudice with its advertisements or hiring practices.
Such a situation would be untenable. No corporation, even one making
money for its core constituents, should be allowed to continue
unchallenged if its actions harm the rest of us. The corporation's
prerogatives do not depend on any natural or human right. It is an
instrument to serve the collective good, broadly defined. If it ceases to
serve the collective good it does not deserve to continue, at least not in the
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same way. If we knew that all corporations, corporations of a type, or even
an individual corporation created more social harm than good, no society in
its right mind would look the other way and no state would willingly grant
their formation.
One would hope that this first principle were obvious. Unfortunately it
is not, at least for one reading corporate law cases and books or sitting in
on business courses in law or business schools. With the occasional
exception, most judges and mainstream corporate law scholars take
shareholder supremacy as the lodestar.7 The concerns and interests of the
public are largely ignored.
Principle One therefore has meaningful doctrinal and theoretical
implications. First, such an insight would mean that externalities do, in
fact, matter. A company cannot be considered a success if the total social
value it creates is less than the social costs it throws off. If the interests of
society as a whole are what matters, then one cannot look just at the profit a
company (or an industry or economy) makes in order to know if it is
successful. One has to look at the cost side of the equation as well.
Of course both "social value" and "social cost" are elastic terms, and,
as discussed below, it may be difficult to define them precisely. What is
crucial to note here is the importance of defining both benefits and costs
broadly. Benefits include not only profit to the shareholders but also
workers' earnings, the stability a company brings to communities in which
it does business, the quality and importance of the company's products or
services, and more. Costs include pollution, over-use of scarce resources,
harmful effects of the company's products or services, mistreatment of
employees, and even more abstract externalities such as the company's
reinforcement of harmful stereotypes. Ultimately, we cannot assess the
social value a company creates simply by looking at its financial
disclosures. One has to know about the company's product or service, how
it treats its workers, and whether it is a good citizen in the community.
Even if their balance sheets were fiscally identical, a drug store that offers
prescriptions at a fair price, treats its employees with dignity, and sponsors
a local playground is more socially valuable than a strip club that waters
down its drinks, exploits its employees, and sponsors amateur nights.
7. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.").
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This leads to the second implication of Principle One, namely that we
need to do a better job of measuring whether corporations in fact serve the
interests of society as a whole. Because we signal what is important by
what we measure, whether it be in a child's first grade class or in the world
of business, it appears that what we believe to be truly important for
businesses is their financial health. Public corporations are required to file
various financial reports to the government and to shareholders. 8 These
reports are vital to ensuring that the shareholders and the public are well
informed about the company's fiscal health. Untruthfulness can lead to
both civil and criminal sanctions.9
Principle One means that the traditional fixation on financial reporting
is under-inclusive. Even though a company's narrow-gauged financial
reports are popularly cited as a measure of the company's worth, they do
not come close to reporting a business's true value. Companies should be
measured on more than their finances if externalities count, we must try
to count them. These reports do not disclose the value of the company to
its workers or to the communities in which it does business. They do not
report on the environmental costs of the company's products or services,
except insofar as such costs are relevant to shareholders (such as the costs
arising from lawsuits). They do not report whether the company has been
complicit in human rights violations. Indeed, there is no general obligation
on the part of companies to gather information about, much less publicly
report on, the true costs and benefits of their activities. 10 The absence of
8. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) ("A
fundamental purpose [of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934]
was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and
thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."); see generally
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq.
(2005)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (2005)).
9. E.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77(x) (penalty of up to $10,000 or
imprisonment for up to five years for violation of the provisions of this title).
10. To be fair, businesses are indeed required to measure and report on a few specific
matters that are important to society's interests: for example, certain employment statistics
relevant to the company's obligation not to discriminate. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (2005)
(requiring employers to keep records relevant to legality of employment practices and
submit reports to EEOC). Also, companies report on the presence of certain dangerous
chemicals in the workplace, relevant to their responsibility to maintain healthy work
environments. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), Pub. L. No. 91-
596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (2005)); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200
App. E (2005) (providing that "employees have both a need and a right to know the hazards
-GREENFIEL  I A . 4/16/2005 11:34:53 PM
A2 OR ENF ELD F NXL DOC 
4162005 1134:53PM
92 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [VoI. 1:1
this information is remarkable. If what is important is the company's
contribution to the society as a whole, it is odd indeed that even the largest
companies are not required or even encouraged to account for their social
impact.
This information is important not only to citizens interested in knowing
the true impact of a company, but also to the decision-makers within the
company itself. Just as we measure what is important, we pay attention to
what we measure. When public policy requires corporations to report only
on finances, corporate decision-makers will, accordingly, make decisions
as if that is their only concern. If public policy required corporations to
make a more robust accounting of their activities, corporate decision-
makers would take a broader view of their responsibilities. Corporate
decision-makers urged to focus only on shareholder return inevitably will
make decisions differently than those who are urged to take account of
broader goals and measures.
It is unnecessary here to articulate precisely the details of any new
reporting scheme for corporations. Sufficient now is to note that a number
of scholars have proposed broader social accounting measures for
corporations I I and that the general idea makes sense. At the very least, and
I do mean the very least, corporations should be required to tell the truth to
their core constituents as they are required to do with their shareholders.
Currently, companies do not even have an enforceable obligation to be
truthful to their employees.
12
A final implication of Principle One is worth highlighting. A common
notion in corporate law doctrine, business training, and even government
regulation is the importance of sustainability: the ability of businesses to
survive over time. In this view, the worst thing a company can do is fail.
Judges in corporate law cases guard against it; business students learn how
to avoid it. Government regulators craft regulations on everything from
pollution to worker safety using business sustainability as a key constraint.
One example is regulations enforcing the Occupational Safety and Health
Act.13  Businesses are required to maintain safe and healthful work
and identities of the chemicals they are exposed to when working."). Even these additional
requirements, however, are spotty and haphazard.
11. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1300-05 (1999).
12. See generally Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud
Protection in the Labor Market, 107 Yale L.J. 715 (1997).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.
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environments, but only to the extent that the requirement to do so is
consistent with the need of the businesses to survive over time. 14 Even
corporate law scholars identified as more progressive often use the
touchstone of sustainability as a guide.
15
Of course this attention to sustainability is important. A corporation
creating wealth for society must sustain itself over time in order to
maximize its value to the society it serves. But note the condition on that
statement: a corporation creating wealth for society must sustain itself. Not
all corporations do that. For those that do not, sustainability is either beside
the point or affirmatively harmful. Sustainability is only crucial if a
corporation satisfies the obligation inherent in Principle One. If a
corporation sustains itself by extracting net wealth from society and
transferring that wealth to its shareholders, managers or others, then it
should be stopped. In other words, some companies should fail.
I am not suggesting that it will be obvious which companies should fail
and which should not. Nor am I advising that some government official be
given the power to make such a choice. However, as a matter of doctrine,
theory, and law, the fixation on sustainability is both distracting and at
times detrimental to the public good. What is crucial is the question of how
we construct a legal framework for corporations that maximizes the
probability that businesses serve the interests of society as a whole.
PRINCIPLE Two:
CORPORATIONS ARE DISTINCTIVELY ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE
TO THE SOCIETAL GOOD BY CREATING FINANCIAL PROSPERITY
One cannot go very far in a discussion about guiding principles for the
regulation of corporations without noting what is special about them: they
are especially able to create wealth. Modern public corporations bring
together a number of characteristics that distinguish them from other kinds
of businesses and that make them particularly successful in making money.
14. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Amer. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (suggesting
that exposure limits for carcinogenic material must be regulated to the point of economic
feasibility).
15. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 280-81 (1999) (arguing that the responsibility of a board of
directors of a public corporation is to keep "everyone happy enough that the productive
coalition stays together").
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These traits include easy transferability of shares, limited liability,
specialized and centralized management, and a perpetual existence separate
from their shareholders. 16  The easy transferability of shares allows
thousands or even millions of small investors to finance the equity portion
of a company; companies that would not exist if they had to be funded with
a small number of large investments are able to have a go at it. With more
investors, companies can grow larger and take advantage of efficiencies
from economies of scale. Limited liability reassures investors that they
will not suffer personal liability if the company fails or is unable to pay its
debts. Shareholders can buy small numbers of shares and are protected
from personal liability for the acts of the company; they can delegate
managerial duties to hired specialists who owe their jobs to their ability to
make the company successful. The separate legal existence of corporations
makes it possible to sustain them over time, even as shareholders and
management change.
These and other characteristics make for a very powerful money-
making institution. Other business forms whether partnerships, sole
proprietorships, privately-held corporations, or newer forms such as limited
liability companies - have their place and have made people rich. But none
of them is as broadly successful as the public corporation in providing the
framework for large business enterprises.
These unique characteristics are creations of law. None of them would
be available without sanction by the state. This is obviously true with
regard to limited liability and the perpetual life of corporations, but it is
also true with the other characteristics, if only in a less direct way. Even
specialized management, for example, is encouraged and protected by
law. 17  The corporate laws of most states protect the management
prerogative of the board of directors and thereby limit the power of
shareholders to make managerial decisions for the company. I8 The very
framework of corporate law is rightly considered a subsidy for business: an
explicit encouragement and facilitation of wealth creation through the
corporate form.
16. Kim Brooks, Learning to Live with an Imperfect Tax: A Defence of the Corporate
Tax, 36 U. B.C. L. REV. 621, 645-46 (2003).
17. Wilson McLeod, Shareholders' Liability and Workers' Rights: Piercing the
Corporate Veil under Federal Labor Law, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 115, 193-94 n.341
(1991).
18. See, e.g., 8 Del. Code § 141 (2005).
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Seen in this way, society establishes the framework of corporate law in
order to create the space in which large public corporations can be one of
the crucial engines of wealth creation in the economy. Corporations are not
the only engine of wealth creation, as governments, universities, small
businesses, individual entrepreneurs, inventors and even stay-at-home
parents contribute to the creation of surplus. Public corporations do,
however, occupy a special place. They are specially constructed so that
making money is their comparative advantage. It is a mistake, therefore, to
assume that corporations should act altruistically in the same way as
churches, families, schools, or social service organizations. Corporations
are institutions with a distinctive purpose: to create wealth. If they stop
creating wealth, they are failures.
It follows, then, that a corporation that does nothing more than create
wealth for its shareholders, employees, and communities is providing an
important social service. Even if the corporation does nothing else to
advance social welfare (and, importantly, assuming Principle One is
otherwise met), the corporation has satisfied its purpose for existence.
Here I differ from some other critics of the corporation.1 9 It may be a good
thing if a business provides meaning for people who work there, finds a
cure for cancer, or funds the local symphony. All these things add to the
positive side of the social benefit "ledger," but they are extras. A company
that is otherwise a neutral, lukewarm actor in society can still be counted as
a success, if it creates wealth for society. Indeed, care should be taken that
over-regulation of corporations does not destroy their ability to contribute
to society by building wealth for it.
Also, Principle Two means that there are some social goods that we
should not expect corporations to produce on their own.2 ° We have created
an entity with a drive to make money; we should not expect it to act
altruistically. Other social institutions - government or non-corporate
private groups must step in to provide goods and services that the market
cannot profitably provide.
19. See Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811 (2004);
C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective For the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
20. See generally Greenfield, supra note 6, at 1411-14 (arguing that the public
mistakenly trusted for-profit airlines to provide for safety and security before the September
11,2001 attacks).
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The obvious question here is how Principle Two differs from the
mainstream view. There are a number of distinctions. First of all, creation
of wealth includes more than just shareholder gain. This follows from
Principle One. We must also include the value to employees of their jobs
and the social worth of the goods or services sold, as well as the multiplier
effect on other businesses that provide raw materials, transport the end
product to market, or sell sandwiches to the employees at lunchtime. Also,
the "extras" discussed above -whether corporate philanthropy or a cure for
cancer - certainly factor into the social accounting.
Second, as social values go, the creation of wealth is not at the top of
the hierarchy. Other values are more important than wealth. Here we must
only consider how we act individually. Sure, as individuals we need
money to survive and we each strive to earn at least enough to provide for
ourselves and our loved ones. Very few of us, however, act as if earning
money is the most important thing in our lives. Those who do, in fact,
seem odd and out of place, even in a society as competitive and consumer-
oriented as our own. As individuals we value other things more than our
money - time with our families, our health, whether the Red Sox will win a
World Series again. This is not to say that money is unimportant, but there
are many things we cherish that have little or nothing to do with how
monetarily valuable they are. Wealth is an instrumental value, not an end
in itself.
Even collectively we often make decisions to put other values ahead of
wealth. We strive to end racial injustice, even if such efforts "cost" us in
terms of financial wealth. We protect pristine wilderness areas not because
of their financial value but because we enjoy walking in deep forests or -
more profoundly we value the idea that deep forests exist, even if we
never get to walk in them. We prohibit companies from discriminating
against potential employees on the basis of their disability, even if such
disability is costly to accommodate. We collectively value justice, fairness,
equality, and human rights even though it "costs" money and resources to
protect them.
What this means is that the corporation should be considered warily.
While it is especially capable of creating wealth, it is not (absent some
regulation) adept at taking care of other values, many of which are even
more important than wealth. Justice Brandeis said it best, in explaining the
historical basis for greater regulation of the corporation:
The prevalence of the corporation in America has led men of this
generation to act, at times, as if the privilege of doing business in
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corporate form were inherent in the citizen; and has led them to accept the
evils attendant upon the free and unrestricted use of the corporate
mechanism as if these evils were the inescapable price of civilized life
and, hence, to be borne with resignation. Throughout the greater part of
our history a different view prevailed. Although the value of this
instrumentality in commerce and industry was fully recognized,
incorporation for business was commonly denied long after it had been
freely granted for religious, educational and charitable purposes. It was
denied because of fear. Fear of encroachment upon the liberties and
opportunities of the individual. Fear of the subjection of labor to capital.
Fear of monopoly. Fear that the absorption of capital by corporations, and
their perpetual life, might bring evils similar to those which attended
mortmain. There was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in large
21aggregations of capital, particularly when held by corporations.
A wariness of corporations is healthy, given the form and powers we have
bestowed upon them.
This wariness leads to the third difference between these Principles and
the mainstream view of corporate law. Corporations are good at making
money, but they can create massive social costs as well. Our collective
attitude of wariness should thus translate into a willingness to regulate the
corporation to ensure it uses its ability to make money (Principle Two) to
further the collective good rather than just its shareholders (Principle One).
The necessary regulation can come as external pressures on the corporation
or can come internally, as changes in corporate governance rules
themselves. As an example of an external regulation, we could tax
corporations an amount roughly equivalent to the net negative externalities
they impose on society. If we wanted to act internally, we could change
corporate governance to make firms more attuned to social good or to
cause the firm's surplus to be shared more equitably.
The ability to create wealth is a very important power of corporations.
As any powerful force, it needs to be constrained and regulated to ensure it
does not careen out of control. The guiding standards for this regulation
are the focus of Principle Three.
21. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-49 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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PRINCIPLE THREE:
CORPORATE LAW SHOULD FURTHER PRINCIPLES ONE AND Two
This Principle is simply the concept that law is necessary to ensure the
first two principles are satisfied. If corporations are to serve the interests of
society (Principle One) and do so primarily by creating wealth (Principle
Two), we need law to make sure those principles are met. Corporations
will not, through their own generosity, internalize the external costs of their
decisions or keep an eye on the social benefits they produce. Perhaps
ironically, because the legal characteristics we give to corporations make
them so capable of making money, we need to constrain them with other
laws and regulations. Otherwise, a small group of managerial or
shareholder elites is likely to gain at the expense of the rest of society.
This principle that we need law to ensure the first two principles are
satisfied borders on the obvious. Few would contest the claim that
corporations need to be regulated to keep them focused on their primary
responsibility and to ensure they do not create undue social costs.
Examples of the former kind of regulation are the corporate law duties of
care and loyalty, which require managers to perform their tasks diligently
and without acting on the basis of self interest, 22 and a company's
obligation to report its financial performance publicly. 23 An example of the
kind of corporate regulation to protect against social costs is the
requirement that companies provide a safe and healthful workplace for
their employees. 24 These examples are straightforward.
Often ignored, however, is the fact that existing corporate law routinely
makes the satisfaction of Principles One and Two less likely. The most
obvious example is the requirement in corporate law that directors look
after the interests of shareholders first and foremost. 25  Consider the
situation in which a board of directors of a public company makes a
decision that benefits its employees financially but imposes long-term costs
on shareholders. Also assume that the board makes the decision because
they have determined that benefits to the employees would far outweigh the
costs to shareholders. Such a decision would violate the board's duties
22. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 309 (2005); 8 Del. Code § 144 (2005).
23. See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq.; Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.
24. See generally OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.
25. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
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under existing law.2 6 The directors might be able to protect themselves
from suit, but only if they lie about their real reasons for doing what they
did.
2 7
This is why it is necessary to articulate what should also be obvious
law should not prohibit corporate decision-makers from taking into account
the very societal interests in whose name the corporation was created in the
first place. What is needed instead is a rule of corporate governance that
would require corporate directors to take a broader view of their
responsibilities and of the responsibilities of the corporation itself. If we
mean to create institutions that create financial wealth for an expansive
range of stakeholders, the rules governing those institutions should align
with that purpose rather than work against it.
There is another way in which existing corporate law is directly
contrary to Principles One and Two: the dominance of Delaware. Under
Principle One, because externalities must count in the social calculus, it
follows logically that corporate governance rules should make it easier for
corporations to know about such externalities and to take them into
account. Also, under Principle Two, the interests of all stakeholders count
when we measure the corporation's ability to create wealth. One would
therefore expect that the best corporate governance rules would encourage
such a sharing of the corporate surplus.
Unfortunately, Delaware's dominance in providing corporate
governance rules makes both of these progressive policies impossible to
implement. As I have argued elsewhere, Delaware externalizes the true
costs of its corporate rules onto other states and non-shareholder
stakeholders. 28 It constructs rules that benefit shareholders and managers at
the expense of everyone else, and does so with impunity.29 In other words,
regardless of whether Delaware's dominance is a "race to the top" or a
26. Id.
27. The business judgment rule would likely protect the directors' decision if they said
that what they were doing was serving the corporation in the long term even if it was not in
fact the case. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). On the other
hand, the business judgment rule would not protect the directors if what they were doing
was in fact in the long term interests of the corporation but the they said that they were
acting in order to serve society. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
28. Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 137 (2004).
29. Id. at 136-38.
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"race to the bottom" from the standpoint of shareholders, it is only a race to
the bottom from the public's perspective.
One possible response to the arguments so far in favor of Principle
Three is that, even if Principles One and Two are correct, it is unnecessary
and even counter-productive to have corporate law mandate that corporate
managers do anything but look after shareholder interests. Corporations
make money, and if we want them to act in a certain way then we should
impose external costs, such as taxes, fines, and other penalties.
Easterbrook and Fischel make this point, arguing that society is better off
when it "conscript[s] the firm's strength (its tendency to maximize wealth)
by changing the prices it confronts." 30 A change in corporate structure to
make the firm "less apt to maximize wealth" will yield less in both wealth
and social goals.31 A similar argument could be made about Delaware.
The argument would be that Delaware's dominance derives from its ability
to provide a set of corporate laws that best maximizes the firm's ability to
maximize wealth. To weaken its preeminence would gain society little in
non-monetary goods but weaken firms' ability to build wealth.
A rejoinder to this counter-argument would start with pointing out how
truly awkward it is to assert that corporate managers best advance societal
well-being by ignoring it. Not even Adam Smith's invisible hand was
assumed to be so powerful that people should be prohibited from taking the
interests of others, or society in general, into account. 32 Yet that is exactly
what corporate law claims to do and what most corporate law scholars
assert that it should do. It is a tough argument to make, however, and few
take the trouble to articulate it fully.
From what I can make out, however, the mainstream view contains
three separate claims. First, advancing shareholder wealth advances
societal wealth.33 Second, broadening managers' responsibilities to include
other stakeholders in fact releases them from any real responsibility.
34
Third, it is more efficient to regulate corporations from the outside than
from the inside.35 These claims can be answered.
30. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991).
31. Id.
32. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 687-88 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Liberty Fund Press 1981) (1776).
33. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 30, at 38.
34. Sol Picciotto, Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131, 135 (2003).
35. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 442.
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The first claim is that we need not worry about non-shareholder
interests, since looking after shareholders will inevitably help other
stakeholders as well.36 At one level this claim is true; a company that is
losing money is not much good to anyone. Once the argument gets beyond
that, however, the claim becomes much more tenuous. A firm that makes
money for shareholders does not necessarily create wealth for others or for
society. Without a mechanism to internalize externalities or to share profits
there is no inevitable gain on the part of workers or society. The "trickle-
down" is not inevitable. Indeed, shareholder profit could result from a
transfer of wealth from the company's employees or from society
generally. For example, by some accounts Wal-Mart's employee wages
are so low that its workers must subsist on a range of government
assistance programs.3 7 In effect, therefore, government programs are
subsidizing the profits of Wal-Mart shareholders. According to one
Congressional study, the federal taxpayers subsidize Wal-Mart over $2,000
38per employee per year.
Moreover, a fixation on shareholder interests will result at times in
managerial decisions that are overly risky from society's perspective.
Because shareholders are protected by limited liability, and thus suffer only
a portion of the costs of bad decisions, they tend to prefer decisions that
may have a high risk of failure but also a high possible payout. But
society's cost/benefit analysis is different, since all costs have to be
accounted for.
Even at its strongest, this first mainstream claim is not an assertion that
a broader view of corporate obligations is a bad idea. It is a claim that a
broader view is unnecessary because the existing scope of duties is good
enough not only for shareholders but for society as well. There is little
reason to believe this, however, other than as an expression of faith. On the
contrary, there is reason to believe that adding to managers' fiduciary
36. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 47 (2004) (quoting Milton
Friedman's invisible hand theory that "all stakeholders are automatically protected.... if we
allow corporations to do what they do best: maximize profits").
37. DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE,
EVERYDAY Low WAGES: THE HIDDEN PRICE WE PAY FOR WAL-MART 8 (Feb. 16, 2004)
(report by Rep. George Miller), available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/WALMARTREPORT.pdf (last accessed Mar. 21,
2005).
38. Id. at 9.
-GREENFIEL  I A . 4/16/2005 11:34:53 PM
A2 OR ENF ELD F NXL DOC 
4162005 1134:53PM
102 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [VoI. 1:1
duties to require them to consider other stakeholders will in fact make
companies better able to make money. This is discussed more below.
39
The second claim made by mainstream scholars is that a broadening of
corporate responsibilities actually makes it easier for managers to avoid
responsibility.40 This argument differs from the first in that it does include
the ironic allegation that society will be made worse off by a rule requiring
its interests to be considered.41 The argument goes like this: if corporate
managers have more than one "master," they can play masters off of one
another, much like a child might play parents off of one another.42 Instead
of the child (the manager) owing a duty to obey both parents (shareholders,
other direct stakeholders, and the public at large), the child (manager) will
be loosed from obligation to either. This is the economists' "agency costs"
argument: enlarging the duties of management will increase the agency
costs inherent in managing the firm, since it will be more difficult to
monitor whether the managers are in fact doing their jobs carefully and in
good faith.43
I think this is the Emperor's New Clothes of corporate law scholarship
an assertion that is made so often and so loudly that few question it
anymore. But the argument is overblown and dubious; it is rarely used
outside the setting of corporate law. It is worth remarking, initially, that
this claim is in conflict with the first assertion of mainstream scholars. If
the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders are not in conflict then
agency costs will not rise much if the law requires managers to take into
account the interests of other stakeholders. The mainstream theorists
cannot have it both ways: claiming on one hand that we do not need to take
care of non-shareholder stakeholders because their interests coincide with
shareholders, and on the other hand saying that the sky will fall once their
interests are taken into account.
39. See Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics, supra note 3; Kent Greenfield &
Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness under Agency and Profit-Maximization
Constraints (With Notes on Implications for Corporate Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 983 (2003).
40. JOE BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER
34 (2004).
41. Id. at 33 (quoting from an interview with Milton Friedman that moral virtue is
immoral when it does not serve the bottom line).
42. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 30, at 38. The seminal case is Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (outlining obligations inherent in duty of care).
43. THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, The Rise of
Regulatory Capitalism: The Global Diffusion of a New Order: The Global Diffusion of
Regulatory Capitalism, in 598 ANNALS 12, 21 (David Levi-Faur, Jacint Jordana eds., 2005).
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My view is that there is indeed a conflict between the interests of
shareholders and other stakeholders in a range of cases. I do not believe,
however, that such conflict is a reason to fear that managers cannot handle
such responsibility or that it would be impossible to know whether
managers are doing their jobs well. Of course it is true, in a mundane way,
that someone who has two responsibilities may have more difficulty
meeting both than if she had only one. But people routinely have more
than one responsibility, some of them even conflicting, and we do not
helplessly throw up our hands. For example, Boston College pays me to be
both a scholar and a teacher. It is not impossible to tell if I am a good
scholar even though I am a teacher as well. What's more, one could still
judge whether I am a good parent or neighbor even though I am dedicated
to my professional endeavors. Humans are quite accustomed to having a
range of obligations.
This is true even in business institutions. Corporate directors and
managers, in actual practice, routinely balance a number of obligations,
some arising from corporate law, some from other areas of law, and some
from the market itself. Corporations, for example, regularly issue different
classes of stock that afford different rights.44 Directors owe fiduciary
duties to holders of all classes of stock even when the interests of the
various classes are in conflict.45 The fact that these interests might conflict
in some cases does not mean that corporations should not issue different
classes of stock.
The only way that more and broader responsibilities would make it
easier for managers to avoid responsibility is that they could use one
obligation as a defense to a claim that they failed in meeting another. This,
however, is more of a function of how responsibilities are enforced than of
the responsibilities themselves, and corporate law duties are simply not
enforced in that way. Consider the duty of care, for instance. When courts
enforce that duty, they reduce it essentially to a procedural duty to
investigate various alternatives, to look at the various possible outcomes,
and to take the time necessary to make a good decision.46 If managers were
required to take account of, for example, workers' interests, the duty of
care would be enforced in the same way it is now. No manager would be
able to erect a defense to a shareholder claim by saying she was unable to
44. MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 161 (1995).
45. Id.
46. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 30, at 98-99.
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pay attention to the impact of the decision on shareholders because she was
thinking at the time about workers. The managers would have to do both.
Similarly, the duty of loyalty would not be loosened if managers were
required to look after non-shareholder stakeholders. In corporate law,
loyalty requires managers to not engage in self-dealing.47  Such an
obligation would not be weakened by including workers among the
beneficiaries of managers' fiduciary duties. Rather, adding to the number
of people who benefit from managers' fiduciary duties will make it more
difficult for managers to self-deal as more corporate stakeholders will have
an interest in monitoring managerial conflicts of interests. A manager will
not be able to defend a duty of loyalty claim brought by a shareholder by
saying that she was actually working for the workers. That would be
nonsense. A loyalty suit is essentially about theft and theft from both
shareholders and workers is no more defensible than stealing from
shareholders alone.
Looking behind the curtain of the agency cost argument, we find the
real worry of the mainstream theorists is that adding to the responsibilities
of management will make it less likely that management will act as agents
of the shareholders. I agree, but that begs the question. It makes no sense
to argue that shareholders should be supreme because any other rule makes
it harder for them to be supreme. Other stakeholders make important
contributions to the firm and all of them depend on management to use
those contributions to create wealth. All stakeholders depend on managers
and must therefore monitor them. A shareholder primacy rule makes it
more difficult for these other stakeholders to depend on management,
raising their agency costs. A relaxation of the shareholder primacy model
might increase the agency costs of shareholders, but it will decrease the
agency costs of non-shareholder stakeholders, and their agency costs are
just as important as shareholders'. To say that only shareholders should
have a rule that lowers their agency costs assumes shareholder primacy. In
other words, we cannot justify the rule of shareholder supremacy by
pointing to shareholder agency costs unless the agency costs of other
stakeholders are discounted and non-shareholder agency costs can only be
discounted if shareholders are supreme.
So, the mainstream contention that corporate law should focus on
shareholders alone reduces to the third and final claim that it is more
efficient to regulate corporations from the "outside" than from the "inside."
47. See Cal. Corp. Code § 5233 (2005).
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Sometimes, this argument depends on the mistaken assumption that
corporate law is private law and that corporate governance should be
insulated from regulation because of the "rights" of shareholders or of the
corporation itself.48 I have, I hope, dealt sufficiently with this argument
elsewhere.49 Here, the only point that remains is an empirical one. If we
want to regulate corporations to serve Principles One and Two, are we
better off using corporate law along with other regulatory mechanisms or
just those other mechanisms alone?
Even progressive corporate scholars disagree on this point.50 My own
belief is that corporate law is a significant untapped resource and that we
would be better off if corporate law reinforced other regulatory initiatives
rather than stood alone. I and others have gone into more detail
elsewhere, 51 but consider here why corporate law could be a powerful
regulatory tool.
Allow me to begin with an analogy. Imagine that we have a goal of
reducing water pollution and that we are considering two possible
regulatory choices. The first allows companies to pollute but then taxes
them in order to pay for cleaning any pollution they caused. The other
requires corporations to change their internal practices to reduce the
amount of pollution. The second one will likely be much more efficient in
reducing pollution at low cost, and the reasons are fairly obvious. It is
often cheaper to avoid a problem than to rectify it later, and it is often
better to give the responsibility to avoid a problem to the person who
knows most about it and can avoid it most cheaply.
The same would be true about a range of public policy issues related to
businesses and the economy. Indeed, corporate law has comparative
advantages over other kinds of law in addressing certain kinds of concerns.
For example, because the principal measure of whether corporations meet
their obligations is whether they create wealth for a broad range of
stakeholders (Principle Two), it is likely to be more efficient to have that
goal be included among the corporation's own objectives rather than
having government redistribute the wealth after the fact. Redistribution is
48. Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics, supra note 3, at 591-601.
49. Id.
50. See Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and
Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2004).
51. Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics, supra note 3, at 581; Greenfield &
Kostant, supra note 39, at 983.
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important, to be sure, but it would be more efficient to distribute the
corporate surplus more fairly to begin with. Indeed, a fair distribution of
corporate profits to employees will likely have significantly positive
multiplier effects (such as workers being more productive because they feel
they are being fairly treated) that would not likely occur with bare
redistribution initiatives.
Another reason why it would likely be better to have corporate law
reinforce Principles One and Two rather than work against them is that
corporate managers may have expertise in areas that government
bureaucrats do not. Moreover, there may be efficiencies in a corporate
setting that do not exist in a governmental setting. A broadening of
corporate responsibilities may allow corporations and their management to
be proactive in addressing issues of social concern which, in turn, might be
more efficient than relying on the mostly reactive power of government
regulation. Finally, progressive changes in corporate governance would
affect the corporation wherever it does business whereas regulatory reforms
largely stop at the border.
More could be said, but for now note that there seems to be no good
reason to insulate corporate law from the same obligations of other areas of
law that is, to serve as a mechanism to move our society closer to what
we want it to be. The mainstream claim that corporate law should serve
only the interests of the shareholder and managerial elite is highly suspect,
especially if we believe that the purpose of corporations is to serve society
as a whole rather than a small wealthy minority.
Once we agree that corporations should be measured by how they
advance the interests of society as a whole, that corporations have a
comparative advantage in building wealth for all of its stakeholders, and
that corporate law should reinforce these principles, the question becomes
how specifically corporate governance might advance these goals.
Principles Four and Five focus on this question.
PRINCIPLE FOUR:
A CORPORATION'S WEALTH SHOULD BE SHARED FAIRLY
AMONG THOSE WHO CONTRIBUTE TO ITS CREATION
To explain Principle Four, one must start with the non-controversial
idea that corporations are distinctively collective enterprises. Corporations
require a multitude of inputs, all of which are essential. The firm needs
financial capital, which they get from equity investors, debt creditors,
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consumers who pay money for the firm's goods and services, and
sometimes from government. The firm depends on labor, which they get
from salaried employees, hourly-wage workers, and independent
contractors. The firm depends on infrastructure, which comes from
governments of various stripes. Finally, the firm depends on a social fabric
of laws and norms that create and sustain the marketplace and enable a
stable society in which the company can operate. The notion that
corporations depend on multiple stakeholders is implicit in most theories of
the firm and is not particularly contentious. The difficulty, of course, is
what to do with that insight.
The mainstream view of what to do with the insight is nothing; the
shareholder is supreme and should be the sole beneficiary of the
management's fiduciary duties.52 The management's sole obligation within
corporate law is to serve the shareholder, usually by maximizing the share
price.53 The others that contribute to the firm protect themselves through
contract or government regulation. The management has no obligations to
these additional stakeholders other than those that arise from their market
power, from contractual commitments, or from some non-corporate source
of law. 5
Once we take Principle One to heart, however, this fixation on
shareholder gain is revealed as a mistake. It is not based on a shareholder
"right" to the exclusive attention of the management, and it is unlikely to
further the interests of society as whole. Rather, the real reason for
shareholder primacy in corporate law has to do with the primacy of
shareholders in the market. Capital is much more mobile than labor or
infrastructure, so it can extract in the corporate "contract" the right to be
the sole beneficiary of management's fiduciary duties. This does not settle,
of course, the normative argument. The market is a creature of law, and
law can certainly constrain it. The law need not mimic the market's power
hierarchy. Indeed, if the purpose of corporate law is to serve society as a
whole, the law emphatically should not mimic the market.55
52. Friedman, supra note 2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See DANIEL J.H. GREENWOOD, DEMOCRACY AND DELAWARE: THE PUZZLE OF
CORPORATE LAW (George Washington Univ. Law School, Public Law & Research Paper
Series No. 55, 2003) (discussing the difference between market allocation of goods and a
democratic allocation of goods available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=363480.
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An alternative to the market arrangement for corporate law is one in
which the collective nature of the firm is recognized by equitable sharing of
the corporate surplus. Let us set aside for the moment the issue of how to
enforce such a sharing. For now, let us focus only on the question of
whether a fair sharing of the corporate surplus would be a beneficial
component of a corporate law that takes society's collective interests as its
lodestar.
There are two related arguments for such an arrangement. First, a
norm of fair allocation of the corporate surplus would be better for firms
themselves over time. Many of the stakeholders in the firm make firm-
specific "investments" - whether of capital or labor or infrastructure -
meaning that their contributions are much more valuable in the particular
firm than they would be generally. 56 This is great for the firm because the
firm can then take advantage of and build on the knowledge and expertise
of its investors, suppliers, communities and employees over time. The
problem that has bedeviled corporate economists, however, is that the more
firm-specific investments a stakeholder makes, the greater the risk. The
firm may collapse, violate some implicit or explicit contract with the
stakeholder, or extort concessions from the stakeholder. As the stakeholder
becomes more valuable to the company, she also becomes more vulnerable.
In concrete terms, imagine that a worker has developed an ability to run a
particular machine that is especially complex and that the machine is not
used by her company's competitors. The problem is that if her company
fails or requires her to take a pay cut, the employee's ability to use her
knowledge elsewhere is severely limited. This risk makes the employee
less willing to dedicate herself to developing the firm-specific ability in the
first place. Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair call this the "team production
problem" how do firms encourage their stakeholders to make firm-
specific investments even though such investments make them more
vulnerable?
57
My answer to this question is that a fair allocation of the profit created
by the firm will help ensure that all stakeholders will be willing to make
firm-specific investments. Because corporations are a collective effort, the
key to sustainability is for those who contribute to the firm to receive the
benefits (or suffer the costs) of the firm in rough proportion to their
contributions. For example, if you are an employee who needs to spend
56. See generally Greenfield, The Place of Workers, supra note 3 (examining other
implications of this economic fact).
57. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 15.
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evenings learning a specific skill that is particularly useful to your
employer, you will be more willing to do so if you know you will gain a
fair allocation of the profit created from your work. How to decide what is
fair is a question discussed later in this article. For now, it is clear that
stakeholders who believe they receive a fair allocation of the corporate
surplus will be more willing to "invest" in the firm. Over time the firm will
be more successful if the various stakeholders are willing to make such
investments.
There is an additional reason why fair allocation of the corporate
surplus will inure to the benefit of the firm over time. Numerous studies
have shown the truth of what we intuit from our everyday interactions,
namely that human beings are "reciprocators" - that human beings tend to
treat others the way that others treat them.58 Road rage is the negative
example; the norm of giving gifts during the holidays is a positive example.
People are reciprocators in the working world as well. For example,
workers who believe they are treated fairly tend to work harder, be more
productive, obey firm rules more often, and be more loyal to their
employers. This in turn likely makes those firms more profitable than they
would have been absent such fair treatment.59
A rejoinder to my argument thus far is if fairness would help firms be
more profitable, why do they not already do it? One answer is that some
firms already try to share wealth created by the collective action of their
stakeholders and some firms even recognize that they owe an obligation to
treat all their stakeholders fairly. The more general answer, however, is
that, in all likelihood, firms simply do not see the potential long-term
profitability of fairness. Boards are elected by shareholders and the law
makes shareholders supreme. Few directors or managers have the
incentive to push their firms to take what must seem like a huge short-term
risk - re-allocating a greater portion of the corporate surplus to non-
shareholder stakeholders for gains that seem abstract. No one wants to
make the first move. The law is needed to overcome this "stickiness" of
the status quo.
Even if one is not convinced that fairness is better for firms themselves,
there is an additional reason to push for a fair allocation of the corporate
surplus. When we take society's interest as our ultimate guidepost, society
58. See Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics, supra note 3, at 633.
59. See generally id.
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is not concerned exclusively with the maximization of aggregate wealth.
Rather, the fairness of the allocation of society's wealth is an important
principle for the United States as well as other democracies. As a society,
we look not only at the total social wealth, but also at the equality of its
distribution.
60
One illustration of this point: at the beginning of every corporate law
course I teach I offer the students in my class a series of three choices.
They are to pick one choice in each pair.61 The first choice is between the
present economy and its distribution of wealth and income, or an economy
in which the top fifth of income earners get a 25 percent raise and the
bottom fifth a 15% raise. This choice typically splits the class roughly in
half. Even though the second choice adds to the economy in the aggregate
and even though the poorest get more than they have now, about half of my
students would rather keep the present economy than allow the richest to
gain even a little advantage on the poorest among us.
The second choice I offer is between the present economy and an
economy in which the top fifth receive a 25 percent gain but the poorest
receive nothing. This choice typically results in the vast majority picking
the present economy even though, as I make sure to point out, the
aggregate wealth of the economy is increased. There are a few that pick
the second option, noting that the poor are not worse off, but most law
students (even those who are in a class about business law) are
uncomfortable with such inequality.
The third choice ups the ante. I again offer the existing economy as the
first choice. The second choice, however, is to give the richest fifth a 25
percent raise and the bottom fifth a 15 percent pay cut. I point out that this
choice increases the aggregate wealth of the nation. Nevertheless, in all the
years I have offered these choices, not a single one of the hundreds of law
students who have weighed in has taken this last "deal." Once we get to
the point where no one would accept such a deal, I point out that, while the
aggregate numbers vary from year to year, this last deal is not far from
what has indeed occurred in America over the last few decades.
62
60. JOSEPH M. ANDERSON, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE WEALTH OF U.S. FAMILIES:
ANALYSIS OF RECENT CENSUS DATA (1999), available at
http://www.census.gov/dusd/MAB/wp233.pdf.
61. I owe this teaching idea to Robert Reich, who used the same technique in a speech
he gave here in Boston a number of years ago. I have used it ever since, and I owe him
thanks for such a great teaching tool.
62. See KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
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I understand that my surveys of my students are not scientific and that
there might have been some students over the years who have not been
willing to admit publicly to preferring a gain in the aggregate wealth at the
cost of more inequality. Nevertheless, my students likely represent the
majority view in our country. I think that, if asked, most Americans would
give up potential gains in aggregate wealth for a fairer distribution of a
lesser amount. In other words, Americans care about economic justice.
63
When we measure whether corporate law serves society, we have to ask
whether corporate law makes economic justice more or less likely.
Economic justice is ignored in mainstream corporate law. In fact, a
theory of corporate law that is based on unconstrained ability to contract
the mainstream view - virtually insures that inequality will be worsened.
The reason for this is straightforward. 64 When people use bargained-for
exchange to distribute goods, the weaker bargainer will be less able to
extract concessions from the other. Even if a contract will make the less-
well-off party marginally better off, the more powerful party will tend to be
much better off. So unless there is some explicit constraint on the ability of
corporations to pass along the lion's share of profit to shareholders, the
nation's inequality will worsen over time. A concern for economic fairness
is a component of society's interests, and public policy needs to (and does,
in a variety of ways) take that value into account.
The question, then, is why corporate law should be used to further the
interests of fairness rather than other areas of regulation. The answer to
this query harkens back to Principle Three. It may simply be more
efficient, as a matter of regulatory policy, to use corporate law to
redistribute wealth and income than to use other mechanisms. I have
discussed this more elsewhere.65 For now, all that demands comment is
that public policy tools that redistribute wealth and income tend to either
work after the initial distribution of financial wealth (e.g., taxes, welfare
AMERICAN RICH 137 (2002) (chart showing that from 1977-1994, the lowest quintile of
income earners had their after-tax income fall 16%. The top income earners had their after-
tax income increase by at least 9% (for those in the 81-90% group) to as much as 72% (for
the top 1% of income earners)).
63. Humphrey Taylor, The Enron Effect: The American Public's Hostile Attitudes
Toward Top Business Managers (The Harris Poll No. 55, Oct. 18, 2002), at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp?PID 334 (last accessed Mar. 31,
2005).
64. See GREENWOOD, supra note 55, at 22.
65. See generally Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics, supra note 3.
-GREENFIEL  I A . 4/16/2005 11:34:53 PM
A2 OR ENF ELD F NXL DOC 
4162005 1134:53PM
112 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [VoI. 1:1
policy) or to benefit only those at the lowest rung of the economic ladder
(e.g., the minimum wage). A stakeholder-oriented corporate law would
work at the initial distribution of the corporate surplus and would benefit
stakeholders up and down the economic hierarchy. Certainly, once we take
economic fairness seriously as a value, we should not blindly accept a
corporate law framework that makes fairness less rather than more likely.
The remaining question, then, is how we implement the requirement
(or even an encouragement) of a fair allocation of the corporate surplus.
This is the subject of the final Principle.
PRINCIPLE FIVE:
PARTICIPATORY, DEMOCRATIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IS
THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE THE SUSTAINABLE CREATION
AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE WEALTH
Once we recognize that corporate law should seek to create the legal
framework that allows wealth to be both created and distributed fairly, the
crucial question is not difficult to see. It is the question of corporate
governance itself: how do we create a set of rules for corporations to
maximize the chances that the organizational principles are satisfied? At
this level of generality, this is the same question that occupies any
corporate governance scholar or any judge hearing a corporate law case.
The difference, of course, comes from the different principles that underlie
the question. For mainstream corporate scholars, the question is essentially
how corporate governance can best mimic what a hypothetical perfect
market would provide. In my view, imitating the market is exactly the
wrong idea in many aspects of corporate law since the market will tend to
contradict a number of principles outlined above.
Because in mainstream corporate law the shareholders are the most
powerful party in the marketplace, they should receive the supreme
position in corporate governance. They are the only beneficiary of
management's fiduciary duties, they are the only stakeholder that can bring
a derivative suit on behalf of the firm against corporate directors, and they
66are the only voters in elections for corporate directors. Once we
understand, however, that corporations are to serve all their stakeholders by
equitably sharing the corporate surplus, it becomes clear that the
66. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 30, at 2, 63, 91, 101.
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dominance of shareholders within corporate management is a mistake as
well.
In place of the mainstream view, I suggest that the key problem for
corporations is how to make the fair allocation outlined in Principle Four.
A fair allocation of the corporate surplus is essential to sustaining socially-
beneficial corporations over time, but allocative decisions are extremely
difficult, especially ex ante. Instead of trying to reach agreements ex ante
about substantive fairness, corporate governance should instead focus on
procedural fairness. Because the stakeholders cannot be expected to decide
ahead of time who should get what, they need to decide instead how to
decide who gets what. The crucial objective of corporate governance, then,
is to create methods of decision-making that offers procedural fairness
among the various stakeholders.
Let us pause here and reference again the work of Lynn Stout and
Margaret Blair, who urge that the main problem faced by corporate
governance is that of team production. 67 In their view, the sustainability of
the firm depends on maintaining the "team" of stakeholders over time.68
They argue that contemporary corporate law achieves this goal by giving
the real power to run the company to the board of directors. 69 The board is
given the obligation to balance the various goals and interests of the firm's
stakeholders so that each of them has the incentive to maintain their own
investment in the firm over time. 70 The reason behind the board having this
power is to address the problem mentioned above - that it is impossible to
decide who should get what ahead of time. The answer to how to decide
after the fact is to give the power to the board. 71 The board makes the
allocative decisions, and so long as they do a good enough job the various
stakeholders will stay over time and the corporation will succeed over
time.
72
Blair and Stout also argue that not only should boards act this way, but
that boards already act this way.73 They assert that current corporate law
allows the board the authority to balance the needs of the various
67. See Blair & Stout, supra note 15, at 305.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 263-64.
70. See id. at 281.
71. See id. at 282.
72. See generally id. at 304-05.
73. See generally id. at 287 88.
-GREENFIEL  I A . 4/16/2005 11:34:53 PM
A2 OR ENF ELD F NXL DOC 
4162005 1134:53PM
114 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [VoI. 1:1
stakeholders by way of the business judgment rule, which protects
management from derivative lawsuits except in the most egregious
situations.74
There is much to praise in Blair and Stout's work, especially as a
normative matter. I, too, believe that it is essential for the board of
directors to consider the interests of all the firm's stakeholders in making
key decisions. Also, I agree that the placing of one stakeholder in a
supreme position in every case will result in the other stakeholders
withdrawing or reducing their investment over time.
I am skeptical, however, of Blair and Stout's descriptive claim that the
board currently occupies the role of an impartial arbiter among the firm's
stakeholders.75 Even though the business judgment rule does give them
much leeway, the ultimate goal of shareholder gain is hardly in dispute.
Moreover, the directors are elected by a vote of the shareholders only, and
only shareholders may bring derivative actions against them for violations
of fiduciary duties. I do not believe that it is correct to say that company
boards are in fact representatives of all key firm stakeholders when they
owe duties to only one stakeholder, only one stakeholder can sue to enforce
those duties, and only one stakeholder can vote them out of office.
To make the important normative arguments of team production a
genuine possibility, the reality of corporate law needs to be changed. In
other words, in order to make it a real possibility that a corporation will
serve its stakeholders by creating wealth in a sustainable way and then
equitably sharing that wealth, the management of the firm needs to be
subject to different constraints than at the present. These changes are
simple, yet profound.
First, directors need to be held to a fiduciary obligation to all the firm's
stakeholders, one that varies according to the contributions of the
stakeholders to the success of the firm. One way to conceptualize this is
that the directors and management should be seen as owing a duty to the
firm as a whole, rather than a specific subset of it. Some corporate law
scholars - including Blair and Stout - believe that this is the best
description of current corporate law, and some cases would appear to stand
for that proposition.76 In that respect, such a change in doctrine would not
represent a huge transformation.
74. See id. at298 300,320 321.
75. See id. at 279.
76. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 787 (Del. Ch. 2004)
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The real change would come when it is acknowledged that a duty to a
range of stakeholders is largely meaningless unless stakeholders have some
way to enforce the duty. The way for that to occur includes allowing non-
shareholder stakeholders to bring suits in court for violations of the duties
of care and loyalty, and providing some mechanism for non-shareholder
stakeholders to elect their own representatives to the board. While the
former idea is better than current law, I believe the latter has more potential
for success over time. Let me explain why.
While the duties of care and loyalty are crucial, they have little
connection to the problem of fair allocation of the corporate surplus. The
best way to have the board make such decisions is to have the important
stakeholders represented there. Certainly the team production model
advances the ball by making clear that directors have an obligation to the
firm as a whole, but there is no way to enforce such a broad obligation. If,
however, the board was more of a pluralistic body, with all perspectives
represented, the ball could be moved even further.
What I am imagining here is, in an ironic sense, a genuine realization
of a nexus-of-contracts view of the firm. If the firm is best seen as a
microcosm of the market, then let us make that real by putting the most
important market participants in a position where they can be heard at the
decision-making level of the firm. The specifics will be difficult, though
not impossible. Employees could elect a proportion of the board;
communities in which the company employs a significant percentage of the
workforce could be asked to propose a representative for the board; long-
term business partners and creditors could be represented as well.
Again, at this stage of the discussion, the specifics do not matter as
much as the notion that the board itself should be a place where more than
just a shareholder perspective will be heard. As they participate on the
board, each stakeholder representative will have the incentive to build and
maintain profitability in order to sustain the company over time. Moreover,
the board will be the locus of the real negotiations among the various
stakeholders about the allocation of the corporate surplus. Even though
(noting that "directors are not required to put aside any consideration of other constituencies
... when deciding how to manage the firm"); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d. 1140, 1148 (Del. 1989) (discussing directors' concern over Paramount's
premium purchase offer because it threatened "Time culture."); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d
548 (Del. 1964) (regarding directors' defense against hostile takeover that would be harmful
to employees).
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board members might be selected for their positions in different ways and
from different constituencies, each would be held to fiduciary duties to the
firm as a whole. Decisions that affect major stakeholders would no longer
be made cavalierly, without someone on the board being able to anticipate
and articulate the likely impact such a decision would have on the
stakeholders.
The fact that the board would have members that could speak from the
perspectives of the company's various constituencies would not mean that
members would have responsibilities to only one constituency. A board
member elected by workers would not avoid fiduciary duty obligations to
look after the interests of the firm as a whole merely because she owes her
position to the workers. There would be no duty of loyalty problem for a
worker-elected board member to weigh in on a decision that affected
workers any more than it is currently a violation of the duty of loyalty for a
shareholder-elected director to vote on matters that affect shareholders.
This proposal for board pluralism will strike most mainstream
corporate law scholars as lunacy. Remember, however, that in Germany,
half of the supervising board of major companies consists of worker
representatives.77 Mainstream corporate law scholars decry this "co-
determination" as inefficient and unnecessary, 78 and my proposal is in
some ways even more of a change than co-determination would be.
Let me answer these concerns in a couple of ways. First, in most cases
no constituency would have an incentive to hurt the company in order to
gain a larger piece of the pie. Even if this incentive were present, the
constituency would be violating its fiduciary duties to the firm as a whole
and could be held to account for its behavior. Second, the possibility of
strategic, "rent-seeking" behavior already exists in the firm; directors now
are elected by shareholders only and shareholders already have incentives
in certain circumstances to put their interests ahead of the interests of the
firm as a whole. A pluralistic board could actually retard those selfish
impulses because any behavior that benefits one stakeholder at the expense
of the firm must be done in full view of the others.
Consider the federal government as analogy. As Madison argued in the
Federalist Papers, a pluralistic federal government where power is balanced
among many different groups actually weakens factions.79  To make
77. Greenfield, supra note 6, at 1423-24.
78. Id. at 1424.
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (George W. Casey & James
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important decisions, one must build coalitions; individual factions cannot
act on their own.80 The same is likely true in corporate governance. The
probable effect of a broadening of the board to include those who can speak
for non-shareholder stakeholders is that such stakeholders will gain a larger
share of the pie than they now get. That, remember, is the goal.
Of course there will be disagreement, sometimes heated, but this is
hardly a reason to shy away from pluralistic corporate democracy. As a
matter of group and institutional dynamics, good decision-making requires
a diversity of viewpoints. As Cass Sunstein has detailed in his recent book,
Why Societies Need Dissent, conformity among people in a decision-
making group breeds error.81 Dissent is essential and "social bonds and
affection" can suppress dissent.8 2 "If strong bonds make even a single
dissent less likely, the performance of groups and institutions will be
impaired., 83 He extends the points to corporate boards: "[t]he highest
performing companies tend to have extremely contentious boards that
regard dissent as a duty and that 'have a good fight now and then.'
' 84
Making the board less insulated and homogeneous will make decisions
more difficult simply because more views will have to be taken into
account and the board will have to come to terms with the effects of its
decisions more often. The fact that decisions will be more difficult,
however, is not in itself a reason to refuse to improve boards by adding a
range of views and perspectives. The real question is whether additional
diversity results in decisions worth the extra effort, and here there is reason
to be hopeful. Numerous studies have shown what one's intuition would
suggest - that "defective decision-making" is "strongly correlated" with
structural flaws such as "insulation and homogeneity."
8 5
This is a common idea, widely accepted in other institutions. We
recognize in legislative bodies, administrative agencies, school faculties,
and non-profit boards that diversity of viewpoints and people increases the
likelihood that dissent will be welcomed, important perspectives will be
McClellan eds., Liberty Fund Press 2001) (1788).
80. Id.
81. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 1-5 (2003).
82. Id. at 27.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 28 (quoting Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, 80
HARV. Bus. REV. 106, 111 (2002)).
85. Id. at 143.
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heard, and decisions will be more fully vetted. "[I]nstitutions perform
better when challenges are frequent, when people do not stifle themselves,
and when information flows freely. 86 John Rawls would appear to agree:
In everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks our partiality
and widens our perspective; we are made to see things from their
standpoint and the limits of our vision are brought home to us . . .The
benefits from discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators
are limited in knowledge and the ability to reason. No one of them knows
everything the others know, or can make all the same inferences that they
can draw in concert. Discussion is a way of combining information and
enlarging the range of arguments.8
7
These principles of good decision-making are thus nothing new or
earth-shaking, they are just systematically ignored in corporate governance.
At base, all I am suggesting is that corporate boards - now among the most
homogeneous decision-making groups in society88 - would stand to benefit
from a greater openness and diversity. Such openness would not only
make for better decision-making but likelyfairer decision-making as well.
86. Id. at 148 (citing LUTHER GULICK, ADMINISTRATIVE REFLECTIONS FROM WORLD
WAR II 120-125 (1948)).
87. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 358-59 (1971).
88. A 2002 survey found that 82% of the director positions on Fortune 1000 companies
were held by white men, 11% by white women, 3% by African-Americans, 2% by Asian-
Americans, and 2% by Hispanics. Gary Strauss, Good Old Boys' Network Still Rules
Corporate Boards, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 2002, at IB (data provided by Microquest
Corporation). Only 8% of public companies have three or more female directors, and only
6% of public companies have three or more directors who are ethnic minorities. See also
Taylor, supra note 63.
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